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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

ANNA MARIE MORGAN,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 2000257-SC

Priority No. 13

:

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

In the opening Brief of Petitioner, the State argued that State v. Morgan, 2000 UT
App 48, 997 P.2d 910, erroneously interpreted the due process requirements governing
refiling of a criminal information. See Brief of Petitioner [Br.PetJ, discussion at 15-24.
The State asserted that State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), does not preclude the
refiling of an information previously dismissed as a result of a prosecutor's good faith
miscalculation of the evidence necessary for bindover.1 See Br.Pet, discussion at 24-30.

1

Defendant possessed 36 grams of methamphetamine. In the first preliminary
hearing, the magistrate rejected Officer Lindquist's testimony that this amount supported
an intent to distribute and dismissed the information. Following refiling and a second
preliminary hearing in which a more experienced officer testified, the magistrate bound
over defendant on the distribution charge. See Br.Pet. at 6-10. The prosecutor admitted
that the first hearing's evidence was "weak" (Rl: 16; June Hg: 5), but stated he
reasonably believed that Lindquist's opinion had adequate foundation since it was
admitted over objection (PHI: 12-16, 34-37; June Hg: 2-5). The prosecutor referred to
any mistake as an "innocent miscalculation" (Rl: 17-18; June Hg: 5).

The State continues to rely upon the facts and arguments contained in its opening brief, but
now responds to the arguments contained in the Brief of Respondent [Br.Resp.].
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS ASSERTION THAT REFILING A
CRIMINAL INFORMATION IS PRESUMPTIVELY "ABUSIVE"
Defendant contends that, but for rare exceptions, the "act of refiling [an information]
itself constitutes harassment" and is, therefore, presumptively barred. See Br.Resp. at 19.
According to defendant, due process precludes the refiling of a criminal information
previously dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the refiled information is supported by
"new" evidence - that is evidence unknown to the State at the time of the first preliminary
hearing - or is otherwise supported by "some change in circumstance that rises to the level
of good cause." See id. at 20. In sum, defendant argues that a prosecutor has but one
opportunity to establish probable cause; if unsuccessful, further prosecution is
constitutionally barred. Defendant is incorrect.
As discussed in the State's opening brief, see Br.Pet. at 21-28, due process precludes
a prosecutor from seeking an unfair advantage over a defendant by forum-shopping or from
otherwise harassing a defendant though repeated filings of groundless and improvident
charges.2 But Brickey did not conclude that due process presumptively precludes refiling.

2

Brickey and the cases cited in Br.Pet at 22, involved forum-shopping in which
the prosecutor sought to avoid the consequences of an adverse ruling by refiling before a
different magistrate, or other abusive practices such as a deliberate disregard of statutory
procedures. This element of "bad faith" is similar to that found in prosecutorial
vindictiveness decisions. Seef e.g., United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548, 550 (10th
Cir. 1978) (due process is violated if there is a showing that pre-indictment delay was a
2

To the contrary, this Court recognized that rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provides a prosecutor with an "unfettered" right to refile an information, but the Court
imposed mandatory procedures to ensure that any renewed prosecution comports with due
process, that is, "fundamental fairness." See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. See also Br.Pet,
discussion at 15-24.
Defendant, nevertheless, claims that a refiled information with its attendant second
preliminary hearing is presumptively "abusive" because a second proceeding incurs
additional "costs" to a defendant and "wastes" judicial resources. See Br.Resp. at 20-21.
But the fact that multiple proceedings may result in additional emotional and monetary costs
and may infringe upon scarce judicial resources, does not alone create a presumption of
unconstitutionality. As even defendant admits, see Br.Resp. at 27-28, an information may
be dismissed and refiled, or a preliminary hearing continued, for any number of reasons
without implicating constitutional interests. For instance, before or after a preliminary
hearing, a prosecutor may decide to voluntarily dismiss an information due to difficulties
with witnesses. If the prosecutor subsequently refiles the information, Brickey is not
implicated because the information was never dismissed for lack of evidence. See Br.Pet.,
discussion at 19. Similarly, during the course of a preliminary hearing, the magistrate may

"purposeful" attempt to gain a "tactical advantage" over defendant); State v. Patino, 12
S.W.3d 733, 739 (Mo. App. 1999) (to establish prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant
must prove that charges were refiled "solely to penalize him for exercising his
constitutional rights" and not as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
3

continue the hearing without raising constitutional concerns. See Br.Pet., discussion at 24-25
n.13.

Under both hypothetical, the multiple hearings created additional "costs" and

"wasted" resources. Yet, in neither case, is the second proceeding considered abusive or
otherwise precluded by due process.3
Proper analysis of due process is not focused solely on the impact of an event on the
defendant for all criminal prosecutions potentially impact a defendant's life and liberty.
Instead, due process balances the adverse impact on a defendant with the State's right to
prosecute. See People v. Sabellx70ZP.2d463,466 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).

lnBrickey,l\4

P.2d at 647-48, the Court struck this balance when it required any previously dismissed
information to be refiled before the same magistrate. This ensures that the magistrate who

3

Defendant argues that withholding evidence "strip[s] preliminary hearings of
their role as a discovery tool." See Br.Resp. at 24. This overestimates the discovery
function of a preliminary hearing. See State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1999)
(recognizing that while a secondary function of a preliminary hearing is to provide a
defendant with details of the charges and preserve favorable evidence, the hearing's
primary purpose is the "'ferreting out of groundless and improvident prosecutions,'"
quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)).
While a preliminary hearing "provides a means of effectively advising the
defendant of the nature of the accusations against him," Anderson, 612 P.2d at 784, it is
not the exclusive or even foremost tool of discovery. The duty to disclose is governed by
rules 4(e) and 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963) and its progeny. In a preliminary hearing, the prosecution is only required to
produce "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16, 20 P.3d
300. This standard is equivalent to the probable cause arrest standard of "fair
probability." Id. & n.l. But the State is not required to produce all of its evidence at the
hearing, nor is it precluded from subsequently accumulating additional evidence. See id.
atHtl0&15.
4

found a deficiency in the first hearing will determine if the State is legitimately pursuing reprosecution, or whether further prosecution is groundless, improvident, and therefore,
harassing.4 See Br,Pet., discussion at 15-17.
Defendant's argument also fails because it rests on a factually incorrect assumption:
the presumption that an officer of the court is acting unconstitutionally. Such an approach
is plainly novel; and nowhere does defendant cite any persuasive legal authority for adopting
such a fundamentally peculiar rule. Indeed, the law is contrary. "Official actions by public
officers, including judicial proceedings, are presumed to have been regularly and legally
conducted." 2 McCormick on Evidence § 343, at 807 (5th ed.) (footnote omitted). See also
Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 52 (Miss. 1998) (prosecutors are presumed to be acting in
accord with state and federal constitutions as well as binding case law, court rules, and
professional conduct rules), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1055 (1999). Accord Tooele Bldg. Ass 7i

4

Defendant summarily claims that the same evidence was presented in both
preliminary hearings. See Br.Resp. at 21 n.6. But as the trial court recognized, the
magistrate was in the best position to re-evaluate his own ruling (Oct. Hg: 20-24). Based
on the evidence in the second hearing, which the trial court characterized as "qualitatively
different" (Oct. Hg: 24), the magistrate effectively reversed his earlier ruling and bound
over defendant as originally charged (PH2: 30). See Br.Pet., discussion at 30-32.
Significantly, defendant has never claimed that the evidence in the second
preliminary hearing was legally insufficient to support the bindover. If the evidence in
the second hearing is, as defendant claims, equivalent to that presented in the first
hearing, then by logical extension, the evidence in the first hearing must also have been
legally sufficient despite the magistrate's ruling to the contrary. Logically, defendant's
position supports the reasonableness of the refiling. See Nicodemus v. District Court,
A13> P.2d 312, 316 (Okla. App. 1970) (good faith belief that magistrate erred justifies
refiling of dismissed information) (case cited with approval in Brickey, 714 P.2d at 467).

5

v. Tooele High School, 134 P. 894, 897 (Utah 1913) (presumption favors the legality and
regularity of the acts of public officers); Lustig v. Intermountain Building & Loan Ass'n,
123 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1942) (public officer liquidating saving and loan association
presumed to be doing so lawfully); Utah Liquor Control Comm 7i v. Seventh District Court,
111 P.2d 144,146 (1941) (officer of Liquor Commission presumed to have seized only that
which was permitted by statute).
Likewise, defendant's contention that Brickey's "good cause" prong only applies to
whether a continuance should be granted - not to the justification for refiling - is incorrect.
See Br.Resp. at 27-28. It is universally recognized that a magistrate's right to control the
preliminary proceedings includes the right to grant continuances. See Utah R. Crim. P.
7(g)(2). Brickey did not, therefore, need to define this right. Moreover, no continuance was
involved in Brickey, only the abusive practice of forum-shopping. See id. at 647.
Defendant claims that Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. App. 1971),
cited with approval in Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647 n.5, limits consideration of "other good
cause" to requests for continuances. See Br.Resp. at 27-28. But while Harper involved a
continuance, its "good cause" language was not limited:
In short,ybr good cause shown, and subject to presentment of new evidence,5
the charge be may be refiled.

5

In the same paragraph, the Oklahoma court clarified that "new" evidence means
that a "prosecutor may not take his dismissed case - with the same evidence - refile it and submit it to a magistrate more likely to be favorable." Harper, 484 P.2d at 897.
6

That decision does not require an additional full preliminary examination, but
instead it provides for the magistrate to re-examine the prior dismissal in
relation to the new evidence offered; and he must be convinced that the
dismissal has been overcome by competent evidence. This presupposes that
the magistrate shall, if necessary, conduct a hearing on the reexamination of
the dismissal either before or after the good cause and new evidence is
offered.
Id. at 897-98 (footnote and emphasis added). See also Br.Pet., discussion at 24-30.
Defendant also fails to acknowledge or distinguish other Oklahoma decisions which
clarify that a finding of "good cause" may justify not only a continuance, but also refiling.
For example, in Nicodemus v. District Court, 473 P.2d 312, 316 (Okla. App. 1970), cited
by this Court in Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated a year prior
to Harper:
While the present statutes do not make dismissal of a prosecution - at the
preliminary hearing stage - a bar to further prosecution for the same offense,
this Court views critically the practice of "shopping" among magistrates or the
repeated refiling of a charge until a favorable ruling is obtained. Without the
production of additional evidence, or the existence of other good cause to
justify a subsequent preliminary examination, such a practice can become a
form of harassment which may violate the principle of fundamental due
process and equal protection of the law, as announced by the United States
Supreme Court. This is not to say that when new evidence becomes available
or when the prosecutor believes - in good faith - that the magistrate
committed error, the charge should not be refiled; but absent such
circumstance, the continued refiling - numerous times - of a charge which has
been dismissed by a magistrate is not to be desired.
(emphasis added). And while there remains some question as to what constitutes "new or
additional" evidence under Oklahoma and Utah law, see Br.Pet, discussion at 24-28,
Oklahoma and the majority of courts clearly permit refiling for good cause:

7

When an examining magistrate rules that the evidence offered by the State is
insufficient to hold the accused over for trial on the charge, such a ruling is
binding and final on him and any other examining magistrate unless the State
produces additional evidence or provides the existence of other good cause to
justify a subsequent preliminary examination.
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169,171 (Okla. App. 1971) (emphasis added). Accord Harper, 484
P.2d at 897-98. See also Br.Pet., discussion at 21-24.
Defendant additionally cites to older Idaho and Colorado decisions, without citing to
subsequent decisions which clarify their holdings. For example, defendant cites Stockwell
v. State, 573 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1977), see Br.Resp. at 18 & 25-26, but fails to acknowledge
or distinguish State v. Bacon, 791 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1990), and Rufener v. Shaud, 573 P.2d
142 (Idaho 1977), both of which interpreted Stockwell and both of which were cited by the
State in its opening brief.6 See Br.Pet, discussion at 23,25 & 34. Similarly, defendant cites
Holmes v. District Court, 668 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983), see Br.Resp. at 19 & 25, but fails to
acknowledge or distinguish People v. Williams, 987 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1999); People v.
Noline, 917 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1996) (en banc); or People v. Sabell, 708 P.2d 463 (Colo.
1985) (en banc), all of which interpreted Holmes and were cited by the State. See Br.Pet.,
discussion at 16, 22-23 & 29. As discussed in the State's opening brief, see Br.Pet. at 16-24,
these subsequent decisions recognize that, absent "bad faith," due process does not prohibit
refiling of a previously dismissed information. If prosecutors follow statutory and rule

6

Rufener not only interpreted Stockwell, but two are companion cases which
were issued the same day.
8

procedures, '"their actions cannot be characterized as harassing in the constitutionally
prohibited sense.'... It is only when the State 'acts in bad faith by engaging in tactics which
violate or seriously undermine the statutes or rules' that 'such an action can constitute undue
harassment and unwarranted oppression of the accused.'" Williams, 987 P.2d at 237 (quoting
Noline, 917 P.2d at 1264). Accord Bacon, 791 P.2d at 433-34 (Stockwell and federal due
process require the "existence of bad faith to prove a per se due process violation" based on
refiling).
For these reasons, a prosecutor's miscalculation of the evidence necessary to support
a bindover - even if the miscalculation is the product of "neglect" - does not per se preclude
refiling. See People v. Vargo, 362 N.W.2d 840, 842-43 (Mich. App. 1984) (refiling
permissible where failure to present sufficient evidence in first preliminary hearing was
"more a product of neglect than a deliberate attempt to harass defendant"); People v. Laslo,
259 N.W.2d 448,450 (Mich. App. 1977) (distinguishing Jones, 481 P.2dat 171, as a forumshopping case, and permitting a refiling necessitated by the prosecutor's "ineptness rather
than [any] attempt to harass defendant").
Alternatively, defendant admits that "some change in circumstance that rises to the
level of good cause" may justify the refiling of a previously dismissed information. See
Br.Resp. at 20. In this case, no changed circumstance occurred between the time of the
dismissal and the refiling. However, a change of circumstances occurred while the case was
pending on appeal: this Court reduced the level of probable cause necessary for a bindover.

9

See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 15-16, 20 P.3d 300 (recognizing confusion generated by
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995), and clarifying that the level of probable cause
necessary for a bindover is the same as probable cause for arrest).
Here, the preliminary hearing magistrate originally dismissed because he did not
accept Officer Lindquist's opinion that 36 grams of methamphetamine evidenced an intent
to distribute.(PHl: 34-35). The magistrate concluded, based on his "own ignorance," that
the drugs could reasonably be possessed for personal use (PHI :37). If Clark had issued at
the time of defendant's original preliminary hearing, it would have been clear to the
magistrate that he was obligated to accept the inference in support of the information and that
a "fair probability" existed that defendant committed the crimes charged. See id. at f 20
(holding that when preliminary hearing facts "give rise to two alternate inferences,"
magistrate must draw the inference in favor of the prosecution). The error in dismissing the
information is apparent under current law, and the good faith of the prosecutor even more
evident.
Defendant argues, however, that this Court may not consider any error in the original
dismissal since the State did not appeal that ruling, but instead chose to refile the
information. See Br.Resp. at 3 n.l &8 n.4. Defendant is correct that the State waived its
right to directly challenge the original order of dismissal. Cf. State v. Jaeger, 856 P.2d 53,
54 n.l (Utah 1994). But she is incorrect that the validity of that ruling is irrelevant to the
Brickey determination. In arguing that the magistrate erred in rejecting Officer Lindquist's

10

testimony, the State is not seeking to vacate the original order of dismissal: the magistrate
did that when he permitted the prosecutor to refile and then bound over defendant.
Nevertheless, the fact that the magistrate may have originally erred in dismissing the
information is relevant to - though not determinative of- the prosecutor's good faith in
refiling and the validity of the magistrate's and trial court's determinations that continued
prosecution was warranted.7 See Nicodemus, 743 P.2d at 316 (recognizing that prosecutor's
reasonable belief that dismissal was error may justify refiling).
The court of appeals agreed that the prosecutor acted in good faith but held that
Brickey barred refiling absent "new and previously unavailable evidence." See Morgan at
Tfl[13 & 16. See also id. at 1J21 (J.Greenwood, dissenting) (finding "no evidence of either
harassment of defendant or forum shopping by the prosecutor"). The propriety of the

7

Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Br.Resp. at 8 n.4, the State presented this
same argument in seeking certiorari review, an argument the State also made in the court
of appeals. See State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12 &ns.3 &4 (arguing the
reasonableness of the prosecutor's actions, the error of magistrate's rejection of Officer
Lindquist's testimony, and the error in refusing to allow the State to reopen); State's Brief
of Appellee, No. 990377-CA, at 10 n.2 & 11 n.3. See also Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)
("[t]he statement of the question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary
question fairly included therein"); Sevy v. Security Title, 902 P.2d 629, 637 (Utah 1995)
(rule 49(a)(4) "should be construed broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable
issues, however peripheral"); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (the test is
whether the issue raised on certiorari was included in the petition for certiorari review, in
the order granting certiorari, or is "fairly encompassed" within the designated issues).
See also LeBron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379-380 (1995)
(once certiorari review is granted on a claim, a party may make any argument in support
of that claim and is not limited to the "precise arguments they made below").

11

majority's conclusion is the issue presented on certiorari review. The good faith of the
prosecutor and legitimacy of the continued prosecution are intrinsic to that issue. Indeed, it
would be incongruous to reverse defendant's convictions on appeal if the preliminary hearing
evidence was in fact sufficient, and the trial evidence adequate.8
This does not mean that this Court must now determine if the first preliminary
hearing evidence was in fact sufficient to bind over. The issue is whether the prosecutor
acted reasonably - that is, with "fundamental fairness" - in presenting the original evidence
and, thereby, acted reasonably in seeking to refile following dismissal. See Br.Pet,
discussion at 30-34.
Defendant agrees that the prosecutor "miscalculated" the evidence in the first
preliminary hearing, but claims that the record is insufficient to establish that the prosecutor's
error was "innocent." See Br. Resp. at 22 n. 7. The prosecutor, however, explained why he
thought the testimony was sufficient and offered to correct any deficiency by reopening and
presenting an additional witness who was present in the courtroom (PHI: 3-4,37-38). The
magistrate implicitly and the trial court explicitly concluded that the mistake was innocent,
that is, made in good faith (June Hg: 6-9; PH2: 30; Oct. Hg: 20-24). Accord Morgan, at
1fl[13 & 21. Other than to summarily dispute these findings, defendant does not establish

8

The impropriety of defendant claiming, see Br.Resp. at 30-32, for the first time
on certiorari review, that the trial evidence is insufficient to support the second degree
conviction of distribution, is discussed infra at 15 n. 9. Defendant does not challenge the
evidence to support third degree felony possession.
12

their invalidity. See State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 19, 20 P.3d 342.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THIS COURT MAY NOT
CONSIDER HER CONVICTIONS IN DETERMINING IF PREJUDICIAL
ERROR OCCURRED
Similarly, defendant claims that this Court may not consider the fact of her
convictions in resolving this case. Defendant is again wrong. Defendant's convictions are
relevant for two reasons: (1) they establish that the continued prosecution was neither
groundless nor improvident, and (2) alternatively, assuming arguendo that anyBrickey error
occurred, they render any error harmless. See Br.Pet, discussion at 32-34.
The preliminary hearing is a screening device, the primary purpose of which is to
"protect[] the accused from going to trial when the evidence presented is insufficient to
establish probable cause." Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438. When a defendant is ultimately
convicted at trial, the issue of probable cause is subsumed by the finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 13,989 P.2d 52 (conviction renders
any error in grand jury harmless); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694 n.3 (Utah App.
1995) {citing State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 n.6 (Utah 1991), for proposition that
conviction moots any issue concerning sufficiency of evidence to bind over), cert, denied,
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
In this case, defendant did not seek interlocutory review of the denial of her Brickey
motion. Instead, on direct appeal from her convictions, defendant argued that her trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to petition for interlocutory review. See Defendant's Brief

13

of Appellant, No, 990377-CA, at9-12. Defendant claimed she was prejudiced because if she
had obtained a reversal of the denial of the motion to quash, she would have been prosecuted
on the third degree possession charge originally bound over. See id. at 11. Because the
issue was raised as an ineffectiveness claim, the State argued the merits. See State's Brief
of Appellee, No. 9903 77-CA, atl4n.4 (explaining why the State addressed the merits despite
normal rule of mootness). In petitioning for certiorari review, the State similarly maintained
that a reviewing court "should consider the reasonableness of the prosecutor's actions and
their actual effect on a defendant in order to determine whether due process was violated."
See State fs Petition for Certiorari at 16. In resolving any constitutional issue, this Court
must determine not only if a violation occurred but if it was harmful.

Here, that

determination necessarily includes the impact of defendant's conviction on any claimed
pretrial error. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ff 13-14 (applying Humphrey rule that conviction
renders any error in bindover order harmless to grand jury proceedings and finding
conviction renders any defect harmless). See also cases cited supra at 11 n. 7, governing the
scope of certiorari review.
Contrary to defendant's assertions, see Br.Resp. at 4 n.2 & 28-29, under the
circumstances of this case, the State is not arguing that defendant's convictions moot
consideration of the Brickey issue. The State is arguing that if arguendo a Brickey error is
found, defendant's convictions render any error harmless. See Br.Pet. at 33-34. The State
further argues that defendant's convictions support the good faith and validity of the
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continued prosecution. The State's position is consistent with its approach in the trial court,
the court of appeals, and this Court.9 See PHI: 37-38; Rl: 17-18; June Hg: 5; R2: 23-25;
Sept. Hg: 15-17; Oct. Hg: 16-19; Brief of Appellee at 10-11 &14\ Petition for Certiorari at
16; Br.Pet. at 30-34).
Similarly, defendant asserts that, assuming arguendo prejudicial error was found, the
State is precluded from arguing that the court of appeals applied the wrong remedy, i.e.,
vacation of defendant's convictions in toto. See Br.Resp. at 33-34. Again, defendant is
incorrect.

The State is not relying on a "new argument" in asserting that defendant is

entitled to no more than a reduction of her second degree conviction to a third degree felony.
See Br.Pet. at 33-34. Throughout the prior proceedings, defendant conceded that prosecution
on the second degree felony, as opposed to a third degree felony, was the only harm she had
suffered from the claimed Brickey violation. See Sept. Hg: 14-15; Oct. Hg: 9-11; Brief of
Appellee at 4, 11. Defendant is, therefore, precluded from making a contrary factual claim
on certiorari review. Moreover, even now, defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the

9

The reverse is not true. Contrary to defendant's claim, see Br.Resp. at 28-32,
she is not entitled to challenge the sufficiency of the trial evidence for the first time on
certiorari review. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 14, 10 P.3d 346.
Moreover, even if considered, defendant's insufficiency argument is meritless.
Sound evidence established that the one of the three baggies of methamphetamine
possessed by defendant was equivalent to 6,000 pharmaceutical dosages, while another
bag contained the equivalent of 122 pharmaceutical dosages (Trial: 121-24,132-33). The
jury fairly rejected defendant's claim that this amount was exclusively for her personal
use. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30,1HJ13-16,418 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (appellate court is
not a "second trier of fact;" the jury has the "exclusive function" to determine credibility
and weigh evidence).
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evidence to support a third degree felony.10
For these reasons, even assuming arguendo that Morgan's holding is affirmed, its
remedy must be vacated. Defendant is entitled to no more than reduction of her second
degree felony distribution conviction to third degree felony possession and reinstatement of
her Class A misdemeanor conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons advanced in the State's opening brief as well as in this reply brief, this
Court should reverse the Morgan decision and affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this q ^ - ^ d a y of April, 2001.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

10

Despite defendant's failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support third degree possession and her prior concessions that reduction was the only
remedy she was entitled to, defendant nevertheless contends that the State failed to
provide any authority for its proposition that the court of appeals erred in vacating the
convictions in toto. See Br.Resp. at 33-34. The State provided supporting authority. See
Br.Pel at 34. In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209-10 (Utah 1993), this Court found
reversible error but entered conviction for a lesser offense where it was evident that the
jury found all facts supporting the lower offense. In Stockwell, 573 P.2d at 122, n.6, the
Idaho Supreme Court recognized that even if a refiling error occurred, the remedy was to
return to the originally bound over charges.
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